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Ill THE SUPREc'lE COUfcT OF TilE
STl\TE

OF'

UTAH

RICHARD L. A. PHILLIPS,
Plaintiff-Appellant.
-vs-

Case No. 15944

REX VAtlCE, Sheriff of Salt
Lake County, State of Utah,
Defendant-Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPOlWENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
The appellant, Richard L. A. Phillips, appeals
from the dismissal of his petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah (R. 20).
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
On May 26, 1978, appellant petitioned the Third
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (R. 2).

Appellant's

petition was heard in the above-mentioned court on July 6,
1978, at which time apoellant motioned the court to continue
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

the matter in order for: resnondent to ans\Jer his intc·rrogat 0 c,
(R. 12).

The lmver court c1eni•cer1 appellcmt's motion for a

continuance, dismissed his petition and ordered appellant
returned to California.

(R.

12, 20).

RELIEF SOU(;HT Oil APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmance of the lo•.ver court's
dismissal of appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
STATEr~ENT

OF THE FACTS

On April 25, 1978, (;overnor Scott M. Matheson
received requisition papers from the State of California
for the extradition of the appellant, Richard L. A. Phillipo.
Those papers were subsequently transmitted to the Salt Lake
County Sheric"

~-or

execution on f'cav 4, 1978.

The ext radi tio~

documents charged appellant with murder and attemoted murder.
On May 26, 1978, appellant petitioned the Third
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, for a writ of habeas corpus (P. 2).

On June 27,

1978, appellant filed a Request for Production of Documents

seeking, inter alia, all extradition documents received b:•
Governor Matheson from California, all California

police

reports relating to the events surrounding the underlying
crime, and any other documents relating to appellant's
extradition to California currentlv in responr1ent' ~j posscss~o
(R.

4,

5).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by-2the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

On June 22, 1978, appellant motioned the lower
court for a Temporary Restraining Order to prohibit

ap~ellant

from being removed to California for a period of 30 days
(R. 7).

The motion was argued before the lower court on

June 29, 1978, and the court granted appellant's motion up to
and including July 6, 1978.

(R. 8).

On July 3, 1978, appellant filed interrogatories
requesting to know what "surveillance techniques were used
at the time of the alleged offense, either on the petitioner
or on his associates," what electronic surveillance techniques
were used and the exact time and place of the crimes

(R. l i l .

At the July 6, 1978, hearing appellant motioned the court for
a continuance "for the reasons that defense counsel is not
prepared to go ahead vli th the case having been unable to com!Jlete
discovery."

(R. 15).

Appellant's counsel argued that he

should be allowed discovery in order to establish whether
appellant was or was not under surveillance by California
authorities at the time of the murder (T. 3, 4).

Appellant's

counsel contended that this information \vould help him show
that appellant was not in California at the time of the
commission of the offense (T. 5).
Respondent argued that it had established a prima
facie case by introcucing California's extradition documents
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and that the burden of proof had then shifted to t_he
to show that he= was not the Richard L.

I\.

an~ella,,

Phillips cha.r'}ed

or that he was not in California at the time of the alleged
(T. 2,3).

commission of the murder.

Respondent further

argued that appellant had had over six weeks to arrange for
witnesses and that even if he procurred witnesses claiming
I

appellant was not in California when the murder was committed,l
I

it would only create a conflict in the evidence which would
not defeat extradition (T. 8).
After hearing arguments for both sides, the court
denied appellant's motion for a continuance, dismissed his
petition for habeas corpus relief, and ordered appellant
returned to California.

(T.

8, 9,; R. 8, 17, 18,

20).

This

appeal follows.
ARGU11ENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY (l)
DENIED APPELLANT'S HOTION FOR
A CONTINUANCE AND (2) DISMISSED
HIS PETITION FOR \•JRIT OF HABE."'.S
CORPUS ~HEN APPELLANT FAILED TO
PRODUCE ANY EVIDF.clCE TENDING TO
SH0\11 THAT HE HAS NOT IN CALIFORNIA
AT THE TH1E OF THE MURDER FOR h'HICI!
HE IS BEING EXTRADITED
California seeks the extradition of annc·J lant on
charges of murder and attempted murder. Appellant netition~
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the Third Judicial District Court for a writ of habeas
corpus, contending that he was not in California at the tine
of the murder and attempted murder (R. 2).

On July 3, 1978,

just three days before the hearing on appellant's petition
for habeas corpus, appellant filed interrogatories on the
respondent (R. ll).

At the scheduled hearing on July 6, 1978,

appellant's motion for a continuance, reauested in order to
allow respondent sufficient time to respond to the

inter~

roqatories, was denied and his petition was dismissed (R. 12).
Appellant now argues that the trial court committed
prejudicial error by refusing to grant his request for a
continuance in order to allow him to engage in discovery.
Respondent asserts that the trial court properly
denied appellant's motion for a continuance, and properly
dismissed appellant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
for the following reasons:
A.
THE CONTROL OF DISCOVERY IS ENTRUSTED
TO THE DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT
AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE
ITS DISCRETIO~l IN THIS W\.TTER.
Pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
il953), appellant filed his interrogatories on respondent.
Rule 33(a) allows a party to serve. without leave of court,
interrogatories on another party which must be answered
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within

t~irty

days.

The rulco allm..·s t:H' court to sho;- Len or

lengthen the time for response and mi1ke'' :u>plicable t''c notioc
to compel! discovery under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(1953), \·There the party served objects or fails to aw;•,.7er.
Rule 37(a) provides an order to compel! discovery
where the party served under Rule 33 fails to respond, but
the granting of this motion rests completely within the

sou~

discretion of the trial court.
Thus, under the Utah Statutory law, ultimate contra:
of discovery rests with the trial court.
First Thrift and Loan, 534 P. 2d 1244
principle is

con~tstcnt

GM Leasing v. Muru

(Utah, 1975).

This

with the practice in other states.

Banta v. Suoerior Court, 212 Ariz. 544, 544 P.2d 653

(197G);

State ex rel. Babbit v. Arnold, 26 Ariz. Aop. 333, 543 P.2d
426

(1976); Commercial Union Insurance v. \vichita, 217 Kan.

44, 536 P.2d 54

(1975); Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co. v. Chez,

527 P.2d 165 (Okla., 1974).

The courts have adopted this rul,.

by concluding that "without reasonable judicial control, the
instruments of discovery arc susceotible to abuse and

~av be

utilized for purpose of delay, annoyance and harrassment."
Jones v. Bank of Nevada, 525 P.2d 1279, 1280

(Nev. 1975).

Because control of discovery lies within the
discretion of the trial court, a rcvicc•.vin<J court- 11ill ovccrtu'
a decision regarding discovery onlv where it

c~n

be

s~own
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that a trial court has abused its discretion.

Johnson v.

American Credit Bureau, Inc., 23 Ariz. App. 199, 531 P.2d
932

(1975).

In Bartholome\1 v. Bartholome<.-r, 538 P.2d 239, 240

(Utah, 1978), the Utah Supreme Court stated that it would not
overrule a lower court's determination as to discovery in the
"absence of any action in that regard which is so unreasonable
as to be classified as capricious and arbitrary, or a clear
abuse of his discretion."

The Utah Supreme Court did not

find an abuse of discretion or arbitrary or capricious action
where a trial court did not dismiss an action with prejudice
where the parties had previously agreed to dismissal with
prejudice if discovery was not completed by a specific date
(GI1

Lectsing v. Hurray First Thrift and Loan, supra) and where

a party was granted summary judgment because the other party
failed to produce his records as required by the trial court's
order.

Tucker Realty, Inc., v. Nunley. 16 Utat 2d 97, 396

P. 2d 410 (1964).
Thus, respondent submits that a trial court's
discretion is very broad in matters of discovery and its
decisions relating to discovery will not be overturned without
a showing of a clear abuse or obvious capriciousness.

In the

instant case, appellant does not contend that the trial court
abused its discretion

in denying his motion for continuance
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in order to allow for discovery, but even if he

h~d,

the

grounds for his complaints would not amount to an abuse of
discretion.
Appellant argues that discovery would have

allow~

him to prove he was not in California when the crimes were
corrunitted without \•Jaiving his privilege against

s~lf-in-

crimination and by more credible evidence than his own
self-serving testimony.

The trial court responded to these

contentions at the July 6, 1978, hearing by observing that
appellant should know where he was on the date the murder was
corrunitted and should have been able to produce witnesses to
establish th'lt he
32).

It is

o'T.-~

\VCIS

not in California at the t:irce.

(R. 31,

::ns thr1t apnellant would not need to engage i

discovery to show his non-presence in California at the
of the murder if, in fact, he was not there.

ti~

If he was not b

California at that time he could have produced witnesses to
that effect, the result of which would have been that he woul'
not have to waive his privilege against self-incrimination
by offering his own self-serving testimony.
pellant contended that the action of the

Thus, hacl ap-

tr~al

court was an

abuse of discretion, it is clear from these facts that no abL'
existed and that the court's action in denying discovery was
proper.
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r.npE'llCJr.t relies heavily on Jlarris v. nelsor:_, 394
U.S. 28fi, reh. den. 394 U.S.

ln:>s (1969), for the urouosition

that "la\·1 and justice" might require the allm·:ance of discovery
in appropriate circumstances.

Respondent does not challenge

this conclusion, but again asserts that the "appropriate
circumstances" for discovery did not exist in the instant
matter.
In Harris v. Nelson, sunra, Alfred Halker had heen
convicted in a California state court of the crime of
possession of marijuana.

After exhausting st2te remedies,

he filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Federal District
Court and motioned the court for an evidentiary hearing, which
the court granted.

Two months later, Walker served upon the

respondent warden a series of interrogatories pursuant to Rule
33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Respondent filed

objections to the interrogatories, alleging they were not proper
in a habeas corpus proceeding.

The District Judge (Harris)

disallowed the objections and directed that the interrogatories
be answered.

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the

order of theDistrict Court, holding that the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were not
applicable to habeas corpus proceedings.
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Ninth C'ircuit "that Sule 33 of thf' Fc•dcral Rulr's of' civil
Procedure is not apnlicable to habeas cornus
394

u.s.

nroc~cding3."

HOI·Tevc'r, the Supreme Ccurt did conclu:k

at 290.

that in anpropriate circumstances, where a district court

''i th

confronted

WJ~

a petition for hubeas corpus \Ihich establ is:,~,

a prima facie case for relief, the district court could
authorize suitable discovery procedures in accordance with
23

u.s.c.

§

2246.

Resnondent first notes that Rule 33 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, the rule pursuant to \•lhich anpellil~t I
filed

interro~at~~i~~

after Rule

or the respondent, is exactly

33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

Harris Court stated unequivically that Rule
applicable in habeas corpus proceedings.
elusion on

pattern~
Th~

33 is not

It busec1 this con-

two~rounds.

First, the Court found that Rule 33 does not
properly fit the special character of habeas corpus

proceedi~

"Indeed, it is difficult to
believe that the drafts8en of the
Rules or Congress would have anolied
the ciscov<ery rules Hithout rno<lificCJ.tion
to habeas corpus procee~inqs hcc~us0
their specific nrovisinns ~re ill-suite~
to the soccial problems and charac~er
of such nrocacdings.
For cxa~ola,
Rule 33, which Walker here invot0l,
nrovidcs for writter1 interrn~r~Lnrirs
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to be served by any party upon any
'adverse party. • As the present
case illustrates, this would usually
mean that the prisoner's interrogatories
must be directed to the warden although
the warden would be unable to answer
from personal knowledge questions
relating to petitioner's arrest and
trial.
Presumably the warden could
solicit answers from the anorooriate
officials and reply 'under-oath,' as
the rule reauires; but the ward2n is
clearly not-the kind of 'adversarv
party'-contemplated by the discov~ry
rules, and the result of their
literal application would be to invoke a procedure which is circuitous,
burdensome, and time consuming."
394 U.S. at 296
Second, because of the liberal construction of
Rule 33, generally provided for by the courts

an~

because

Rule 33 allows the filing of interrogatories without leave of
court, the Harris Court felt that the blanket availability
of discovery in habeas corpus proceedings would only serve to
delay the proceedings and do violence to the puroose of
habeas corpus.
"Except for interrogatories to
bv the 'plaintiff' within
10 c1avs aft,;,r the cOcU'1ence:nent of
'the action,' Rule 33 provides that
the interrogatories may be served
without leave of court. The 'adverse
party' must then take the initiative
to contPst the interrogatories and
a heat· ins in court on his objections
is require~.
Unavoidably, unless
thoro i.s Cl neusure of responsibility
be

serve~
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in the oric;inator of the nroc~cclin<J,
the 'nlaintiff' or p~titioner, this
nroce~ure can be exceedingly burJen~ome and vexatious.
T!1e interrogato!-v
procedure would be available to the
prisoners thenselves since most
habeas petitions are prepared and
filed by orisoners, generally without
the guidance or restraint of nembers
of the bar.
For this reason, too, w~
conclude that the literal application
of Rule 33 to habeas corous proceedinss
would do violence to the efficient
and effective administration of the
Great l·lrit.
The burJen uoon courts,
ori~on officials, prosecutors, and
police, which is necessarily and
prooerly incident to the processing
an] acjudication of habeas corpus
nro:::ee,1i,..,c;s, t•rould be vastly incre2sej: and the bene~it to prisoners
~c
~~ counterbalanced ty the
'=l~y chich the elaborate discovery
procedrres would necessarily entail."
394 U.S. at 297.
For these reasons, the Harris Court conC' luded that
the discovery provisions of Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure woulJ not be applicable in habeas corpus
proceedings.

Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

being patterned

after R•cle :03 of thE' Federal Ru]c·s, the salle

reasor.s and conclus-ions a'J"'lV in the instan+:
Sheriff Vance, is ill-equi ppEoc1 to a.r.sHer the

c2.:~c·.

~-\esoo:den~-·

crue~o t

LOns oro-

oounded in aopellant's interro0atorics as they dr·.•l with a
Like-

murder and attemr>tecl murder co:nr1i ttcc1 in Citlifon•

i

wise, such a broac1ranging prelininary innu1rv ic;

11cither

1.
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necess~ry

or

ar0ron1~iate

in

th~

context of a hateas corpus

proceeding in connection with an extradition.
reasons, respondent asserts that Rule 33

o~

For these

the Utah Rules

of Civil Procedure should not be applied in habeas
proc~edings

cor~·s

brought to defeat extradition.

~~ile

the Harris Court held Rule 33 inapplicable

to habeas corpus proceedings, it did note that 28 U.S.C.
§

2246 might allow discovery in habeas

very limited circumstances.

cor~us

Ratters in

Section 2246 allows disposition,

in the discretion of the judge, on application for habeas
corpus.

Respondent notes t:1at Rule 65B (i) of the Ute>.h Rules

of Civil Procedure contains no comparable provision which
._.rould allow for even liwited discovery in habeas corpus proThus, respondent ass<"rts that, under Utah law, the

cef'd inrJs.

filing of interrogatories is improper in a habeas corpus
proceeding.
!1.

APPELLANT FAILED TO FILE HIS
INTERROGATORIES IN A TIMELY
!1_1\."'UES..

Appellant filed his petition for writ of habeas
cornus on May 26, 1978

(R. 2), but did not file his in-

terroqDtorics until ,!uly 3, 1978,

(R. 1 1

),

just three days

before thr; scheduled hearing on his petition.
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Courts have lonr:J hc:ld th,lt intc;rroqo !-.~r

i.l'S

s~r',7ec1

long after thE> commencement of un action ancl il short tine
before the case is set for trial come too lut0.
Proc., 3rd Ed., p. !176.
N. 1·7.R. Co.,

Indeed, in Theis v. Chicaqo and

107 Imva 522,

Court of Iowa found that

78 N.\'7.

w~ere

199

(1899),

the Sunre;-'1 1,

a olaintiff had begun an

in November of 1895 which was set for trial on

~ugust

acti~

29,

1896, and had not filed intc;rrogatories until Z\ugust 13, l39f,

the interrogatories were not tinely filed.

The Iowa court

concluded that the Plaintiff could hAve filed his

interro'J~tou

substantially earlier and that by waiting as he did would
create substantial delays.
In Heffron v. Los Angeles Transit Lines, 170 Cal.
Ap!J. 2d 709, 339 P.2d 567
November 2, 1956.
February 24, 1958.

(1959),

the plaintiff filed suit or.

On November 26, 1957, trial was set for
Plaintiff filed his interrogatories on

February 5, 1958, to which responr1ent promntlv ohjectcc1.

T''e

California District Court of Anneals found that nlaintiff's
interrogatories had not

bee~

Filed in a

ti~ely

manner

an~

allowed respondent's objections to them.
The above-quoted cases clearly illustrate the
requirement that interrogiltories be filed in a
This is especially critical in a

haccC~s

tim~lv

Eash0

cornu'; nrn-::,cJinc;
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bnc~use

oE the exneJited

n~ture

of the

uherC' the habeas cor;>u•; proceeding

<~as

proceedin~.

Purthermore,

ini tia te·1 to challenge

extradition, also on expedited proceeding, there is even
further need to act quickly and file interrogatories in a
timely fashion.
Respondent asserts that the trial court properly
denied appellant's request for a continuance, in order to
allow resoondent

ti~e

to answer his interrogatories, because

said interrogatories were not filed until three days before
the scheduled

he~ring

on appellant's netition for habeas

corpus.

c.
HAD THE TRIAL COURT GR.I\'ri'ED
APPELLl\NT' S T10'I'IOC' FOR A COllTI~UANCE IN ORDER TO ALLOW
RESPONDENT SUFPICIENT TIME TO
Cl.ESPo;m TO .Z\PPELLA"lT' s INTERROGATORIES, THE INPO~~I\TION
PROCURRED THROUGH DISCOVE"n
\•IOULD 'lOT HAVE BEEN ADEQUATE TO
HELP APPELLl'.NT CARRY HIS BURDEN
OF' PROOF.

At the hearing on apnellant's petition for habeas
con ·us. etnoellant co!"'tenc1ed t"lat he ':las not in the deT:landing

state

(CaliFornia) at the time the offense which he had been

accused of cOICLmitting 1·;as perr:>etrated
ar~uec1
1•1"1]·1

(T.

3).

.'\,-,pellant

that the inform3tion he sought by way of discovery
.~]l_o,··

him to sho'T that he Has not in C2.lifornia at the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-1')-

R.es~Ondr;nt

C1SS~rts

ao?ellant the C!isco'.'f'ry he sought,
thereby

\VOt!ld

~~ot::r:-t

t-_ha_t_ haa the:> tr.i:Il

Srrlnt::rl

the in"on'l=ttion crained

not have established that he '''CIS n•1t in

California at the tiP.l.e the

crimes Here comr1ittcocl.

Therefore,

appellant would not have carried his burden of rroaf and the
trial court would have been com:Jelled to dismis'; his petitior.
One

way a request for extradition may be

defeat~

by the person demanded is to estctblish th0t he \,.,·,s not in the
demanding state at the time the crime with which
State ex rel.

with committing was perpetrated.
lvestheus, 318 tlo.

928,

2 S.\·?.

2d 612

(1928).

.>:.-~ .. '

v.

ElroC::,

3L!L! N.E.

2d

is

G~ines

HOV/C'Ver,

denanded oersorc ··c;st n::-ove this fact beyond a
People ex rel.

~P

charg~

v.
the

rc~t~:onabJe

71~

(111.,

dr>cbl

1976).

If his evidence is r1erely contradictory, i t \vill not overcome
the prima facie case established by the
Smith v. State,

373 F.2d H'l

South Carolina v.

Governor'~

(9th Cir., 1%7).

Bailev, 2'39 U.S.

412

(1933),

States Supreme Court stated that a court \vould

warrant.

l ndeed,

in

t!>C' United
no~

discharge:

"a de::enc:ant 2rrested und'C'r [a]
governor's \·'arrant '.'l~ere t~r::re i.s
merely contradictory evidence on the
subject of nres~nce in or absence
fran the st~te, as habeas carnus is
not tho nroner procecrting to try the
question of alibi, o>:- anv crucstion
as to thP guilt or innocence of the
accusrecl."
289 U.S. at ~21.
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release at thQ trial level, he woulrt
t~at

hcvond a reasonable doubt

h~v2

hart to estahlish

he was not in CaliFornia

when the cr imcs 1vere com.--n.i t ted.

J'.ppellant pronoscd to n::-ove

this bv discoverino 11hether California nolice h'l0 him unJer
surveillance at the time of the cooonission of the murder
and attempted

~urder.

Appellant anparently believed that he

was under surveillance by California police elsewhere when the
crimes were committed and that police

repo~ts ~ight

establish

that fact.
Assuming, arguendo, that discovery had been

allo~ed

and that the oolice reports showed appellant to have been under
surveillance at a location away froD the scene of the murder
and attempted murder, that fact would not establish that
anrellant was r.ot in California 1vhen the crimes were corru-,litted,
but rather thilt he

I'JS

in California at the time.

The fact

that he was under surveillanc0 aHay froH the scene of the
crimes is not relevant to
'.7oulc

1

t~e

he raised os an Cl.li_bi

South Carolina v.

2.t

extradition proceeding, but
his trial in California.

nailev, suora.

Assuming, arquendn, that discovery had been allowed
an~

that the nolicc renorts showed that appellant was not

unclpr nol icE' surv0j ]_ l2nce at the til'le of the com.rnission of the
cL·ir1cs,

this fact l·iotlld not

e~t?J·lish

bcvond a reasonable doubt
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cor.1mission of t:r.e

cri~1es

charqerl.
und~r

prove that appellant was not

police surveillance at

the time.
For appellant to

prev~il

on his

clai~

t~at

he

was not in California vlhen t'le cri:r10s were corrw.ittecl, h<e

m•J'~

show by credible evidence thRt he was outside the state.
In either case hypothesized above the

evidenc~

would not

be sufficient to establish th::!t necessarv fact.
discovery been allowed, the

in~ornatio~

Thus, had

sought by tho

appellant would not have teen adequate to sustain his burden
of proor arc' r,::-cr·•·c·' his release.

Therefor,.., the triill court

properly denied apPellant's motion for a continuance in
order to obtain discovery.
CONCLUSIO'~

Respondent asserts that the trial court properly
denied appellant's request for a continuance in order to
facilitate his request for

discn~erv

because (l)

the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is not
habeas corpus procec>dinCJS and

Pule 33 o•

anolica~le

to

(2) aopellilnt' s interroqatories

were untimely filed.
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Respondent further etsserts thQt the tcial court
properly dismissed appellQnt's petition for writ of habeas
corpus because appellant failed to show that he was not in
California at the time the charged crirtes 1t1ere comrr.itted.
Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT B. H?.~7SE!-i
Attornev General
EARL F. D!)~IUS
Assistant Attorney General
~ttcrneys

for Respondent
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